Off the Tracks: How a Train Accident Derailed Article III Power by Decker, Kevin M. et al.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 4 Article 6
2010





Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Decker, Kevin M.; Schmidt, Jonathan; and Hinrichs, Christine (2010) "Off the Tracks: How a Train Accident Derailed Article III
Power," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 36: Iss. 4, Article 6.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss4/6
OFF THE TRACKS: HOW A TRAIN ACCIDENT DERAILED
ARTICLE III POWER
Kevin Decker,t Jonathan Schmidt,tt and Christine Hinrichstt
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1435
II. THE DERAILMENT AND ENSUINGJUDICIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS ................................................... 1436
A . The A ccident ................................................................... 1436
B. Federal Railroad Safety Act Preemption ............................ 1437
C. FRSA Preemption is Brought to Bear ................................ 1437
1. Allende v. Soo Line Railroad Co ........................... 1438
2. Mehl v. Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd ................... 1439
3. Lundeen v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co .............. 1439
a. Initial District Court Proceedings ......................... 1439
b. The First Lundeen Appeal .................................. 1440
4. District Court Proceedings Post-Lundeen I ................. 1442
D. Congress M akes a Play .................................................... 1442
E. The Eighth Circuit's Decision and Rationale .................... 1444
III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CONFLICT ............................. 1446
A. Historical Underpinnings ................................................ 1446
1. H ayburn's Case ....................................................... 1448
2. U nited States v. Klein ............................................. 1449
3. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc ............................... 1452
B. The Eighth Circuit Stands in Conflict of Supreme Court
and Circuit Precedent ...................................................... 1453
1. Lundeen II Runs Afoul of Supreme Court "Final"
Decision Precedent ..................................................... 1453
t Mr. Decker is a shareholder at Briggs and Morgan, P.A., with a focus on
complex business litigation. He graduated from William Mitchell College of Law in
2001.
tt Following graduation from William Mitchell College of Law where he served
as the Law Review's Editor-in-Chief for Volume 29, Mr. Schmidt clerked at the
Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. He is now an
associate at Briggs and Morgan, P.A., where his practice focuses primarily on state and
federal appeals as well as business litigation.
ftt Ms. Hinrichs graduated summa cum laude from William Mitchell College of
Law in 2009. She is currently clerking at the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
1
Decker et al.: Off the Tracks: How a Train Accident Derailed Article III Power
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
OFF THE TRACKS
2. Lundeen II Conflicts With Circuit Authority ............. 1455
a. Circuit Courts Protecting Article III Prerogative .... 1455
i. First Circuit .................................................. 1455
ii. Fift h Circuit .................................................. 1456
iii. Seventh Circuit ............................................. 1457
iv. N inth Circuit ................................................ 1457
b. Lundeen II Stands in Conflict ........................... 1458
IV . IM PLICATIO NS ...................................................................... 1458
A. Lundeen, Plaut, and the Collateral Order Doctrine ......... 1459
B . Illustrations .................................................................... 1461
1. Jurisdiction ............................................................... 1461
2. Im m unity .................................................................. 1462
3. Other Examples ......................................................... 1464
C. Tipping the Balance-Congress and the Judiciaiy ............ 1464
V . C O NCLUSIO N ....................................................................... 1466
I. INTRODUCTION
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of
the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered
by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that...
[none] of them ought to possess directly, or indirectly, an overruling
influence in the administration of their respective powers. It will not
be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought
to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it.
Since the dawn of the country, the judiciary's raison d'etre has
2been to interpret and declare the law. In Lundeen v. Canadian Pacific
Railway Co., 3 however, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Congress
may statutorily reverse a final courtjudgment so long as other aspects
of the case remain pending.4 Lundeen exacerbates a circuit conflict
regarding the permissibility of legislative encroachments on final
judicial judgments.
The immediate result of Lundeen was to strip federal jurisdiction
over hundreds of lawsuits destined for dismissal and place the
litigation back in a state court where the cases would head for trial.
The lasting effect of this breach of separation of powers could be far
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
2. U.S. CONST. art. III.
3. 532 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2008).
4. Id. at 691.
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more penetrating; Congress may now be emboldened to usurp
judicial prerogative over specific declarations of law whenever other
issues in a litigated dispute persist. Final rulings on jurisdiction,
injunctive relief, and other interlocutory matters are now fair game
for legislative meddling. This is not your Founding Fathers' separa-
tion of powers.
II. THE DERAILMENT AND ENSUINGJUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL
ACTIONS
A. The Accident
Lundeen traces its origins to a train accident onJanuary 18, 2002,
outside of Minot, North Dakota, where a Canadian Pacific Railway
(CP) freight train derailed thirty-one of its 112 cars. According to the
National Transportation Safety Board:
Five tank cars carrying anhydrous ammonia, a liquefied
compressed gas, catastrophically ruptured, and a vapor
plume covered the derailment site and surrounding area.
The conductor and engineer were taken to the hospital for
observation after they complained of breathing difficulties.
About 11,600 people occupied the area affected by the va-
por plume. One resident was fatally injured, and 60 to 65
residents of the neighborhood nearest the derailment site
were rescued. As a result of the accident, 11 people sus-
tained serious injuries, and 322 people, including the 2 train
crewmembers, sustained minor injuries. Damages exceeded
$2 million, and more than 8 million has been spent for
environmental remediation.
Within one week of the accident, a class action suit was filed in
North Dakota federal district court on behalf of all Minot residents]
Several hundred individual lawsuits were later filed in Hennepin
8County, Minnesota. All of these cases invoked common law negli-
5. NAT' L TRANsP. SAFETY BD., DERAILMENT OF CANADIAN PAciic RAILwAYFREIGHT
TRAIN 29216 AND SUBSEQUENT RELEASE OF ANHYDROUS AMMONIA NEAR MINOT, NORTH
DAKOTA JANuARY 18, 2002, at vi (Mar. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/RAR0401.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Mehl v. Can. Pac. Ry. Ltd., 227 F.R.D. 505,507-08 (D.N.D. 2005).
8. In reSoo Line R.R. Co. Derailment ofJan. 18, 2002, No. MC 04-007726,2006
WL 1153359, at *1, n.3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 24, 2006). Presumably, the Minnesota-
based cases sought to escape North Dakota tort reform legislation, but the Hennepin
County court ultimately ruled that North Dakota law would govern all substantive
issues. See id. at *7.
1436 [Vol. 36:4
3
Decker et al.: Off the Tracks: How a Train Accident Derailed Article III Power
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
OFF THE TRACKS
gence claims to focus upon the railroad's inspection and maintenance
practices and performance. 9
B. Federal Railroad Safety Act Preemption
At the heart of the state-law-based lawsuits were questions regard-
ing the scope of federal preemption under the Federal Railroad
Safety Act (FRSA) .' At the time, § 20106 of the FRSA provided that
state law is preempted whenever the subject matter is "covered" by
federal standards:
Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety and
laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad security shall
be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may
adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order re-
lated to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), or
the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad
security matters), prescribes a regulation or issues an order
covering the subject matter of the State requirement."
This preemption clause posed two significant complications for
the Minot-derailment plaintiffs. First, the U.S. Supreme Court
broadly read the preemption scheme to extend to state-law-based
common law claims. 2 Thus, "covered" state law causes of action were
subject to dismissal. 3 And in addition to precluding "covered" state
law claims on the merits, the FRSA had been read by certain courts as
giving rise to "complete" preemption so as to afford federal jurisdic-• , , . 14
tion over "covered" actions. Having to proceed in federal court
would likely heighten the evidentiary burdens for toxic tort plaintiffs
like the Minot residents.
C. FRSA Preemption is Brought to Bear
Through a series of separate-yet related-decisions, both the
jurisdictional and defensive attributes of FRSA preemption took
9. See, e.g., Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1010 (D. Minn.
2007) (considering plaintiffs' claims of negligent inspection, negligent construction
and maintenance, negligent hiring and training, and negligent operation).
10. 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20120 (Supp. 2007 and West 2009).
11. Id. § 20106 (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
12. Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344,359 (2000); CSX Transp., Inc.
v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 658 (1993).
13. In re Derailment Cases, 416 F.3d 787, 793-94 (8th Cir. 2005).
14. See, e.g., Peters v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 80 F.3d 257, 262 (8th Cir. 1996).
2010] 1437
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center stage in the Minot derailment litigation, culminating in
Congress legislatively reversing the Eighth Circuit's Lundeen decision.
1. Allende v. Soo Line Railroad Co."
CP invoked "complete" FRSA preemption to remove to federal
court all then-pending Hennepin County cases.1 6 The railroad cited
regulations like 49 C.F.R. § 213.233 (track inspection standards) as
"covering" the plaintiffs' claims; plaintiffs responded that the railroad
failed to comply with federal standards and thus could not invoke
preemption. Due to the volume and relatedness of the removed
lawsuits, the parties stipulated that Allendewould be thejurisdictional
17
test case.
The Allende court read the applicable precedents as requiring a
federal remedy to substitute for a state cause of action before
jurisdictional preemption could be recognized." Because the FRSA
provided for civil penalties enforced by the Federal Railway Adminis-
tration (FRA), but made no provision for private recourse for a
railroad's noncompliance with inspection and maintenance stan-
dards, Allende and all other Minot derailment cases were sent back to
state court.' 9 And because the remand order was based upon a lack of
federal jurisdiction, CP could not appeal. u
Back in state court, CP moved to have the cases dismissed on
FRSA preemption grounds.2 After the state court denied CP's
motion, the railroad admitted liability for the Allende case and two
other related lawsuits slated for trial.22 A Hennepin County jury
subsequently returned damages verdicts for the plaintiffs.2 The other
cases moved up the queue for trial.
15. No. 03-3093, slip op. (D. Minn.Jan. 29, 2004).
16. See, e.g., Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 447 F.3d 606, 614-15 (8th Cir. 2006)
[hereinafter Lundeen 1].
17. See Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 342 F. Supp. 2d 826, 828 n.2 (D. Minn.
2004) (noting prior removal and remand history).
18. Allende, No. 03-3093, slip op. at 19-20.
19. Id. at 32-33.
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006) ("An order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise. ... ").
21. See In re Soo Line R.R. Co. Derailment ofJan. 18, 2002 in Minot, ND, No.
MC-04-007726, 2006 WL 1153359, at *2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 24, 2006).
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2. Mehl v. Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd.24
While the Hennepin County cases were proceeding toward trial
in waves, the first filed case-the Mehl class action-came to an
abrupt end in the federal district court for North Dakota. CP had
filed a motion to dismiss that was substantively identical to the
pleadings in the Hennepin County court, and the federal court
granted its motion.25 The district court, in a decision written by then-
Chief Judge Daniel Hovland, rejected the conclusion of the state
court. The district court held that claims arising out of the Minot
derailment were "covered" by federal regulations and therefore
26preempted by § 20106 of the FRSA. The Mehl court was "convinced
the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims is inevitable under the current state
of federal law in the Eighth Circuit. ,27
The Mehlcourt specifically rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
§ 20106's "coverage" mandate does not reach claims regarding a
railroad's failure to comply with (1) the federal standard of care
established by a "covering" regulation or order; (2) its own plan, rule,
or standard created pursuant to a "covering" regulation or order; or
(3) a state law, regulation, or order not incompatible with federal
railroad policy. 2 8 The Mehl plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit.2
°
3. Lundeen v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.
a. Initial District Court Proceedings
Both before and after Mehl and Allende, Minot residents contin-
ued to file claims against CP. After the first lawsuit was filed in federal
district court in North Dakota, nearly every subsequent lawsuit was
filed in Minnesota state court in Hennepin County. Moreover, after
the Allende court found that the claims did not pique federal court
jurisdiction, almost all of the successive lawsuits parroted those causes
of action.
In the fall of 2004, a group of Minot residents led by the Tom
Lundeen family filed complaints in Hennepin County substantially
similar to their predecessors. But the Lundeens went one step further
24. 417 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (D.N.D. 2006).
25. Id. at 1113-15.
26. Id. at 1109-19.
27. Id. at 1120.
28. Id. at 1108-09,1115-16.
29. See Lundeen v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1010 (D. Minn.
2007) (noting Mehl appeal pending before Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals).
2010] 1439
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and asserted a violation of federal environmental law, enabling the
30
railroad to remove to federal court. CP invoked federal question
grounds and prevailed against the Lundeens' motion for remand."
In response, the Lundeens moved to amend the complaints to
delete the federal allegations. The district court allowed the
amendment and then granted remand 3  Because the court had
found the complaints as initially pled invoked federal jurisdiction, the
remand was discretionary and CP was able to appeal to the Eighth
Circuit.34
b. The First Lundeen Appeal
The Lundeen appeal initially focused on forum shopping." Sub-
sequent to oral argument, however, the panel ordered additional
briefing on the questions of whether complete preemption or
underlying substantial federal questions afforded jurisdiction. 
6
Despite the non-appealability of the earlier Allende decision, CP would
get its "complete" preemption appeal after all.
The Eighth Circuit ultimately held that "coverage" alone deter-
317mines the § 20106 preemption analysis. Consequently, even claims
about non-compliance with "covering" federal standards were
foreclosed:
[F] ederal regulations establish a specific inspection protocol
including how, 49 C.F.R. § 213.233(b), when, §§ 213.233(c)
& .237(a)-(c), and by whom, §§ 212.203, 213.7 & .233(a),
track inspections must be conducted; the regulations estab-
lish a national railroad safety program intended to promote
safety in all areas of railroad operations, § 212.101 (a); feder-
al and state inspectors determine the extent to which the
30. See Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 342 F. Supp. 2d 826, 828-31 (D. Minn.
2004).
31. Id.
32. Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., No. 04-3220, 2005 WL 563111, at *1 (D. Minn.
Mar. 9, 2005).
33. Id. at *3.
34. Id; see also Lindsey v. Dillard's, Inc., 306 F.3d 596, 598-600 (8th Cir. 2002)
(discretionary remand not affected by § 1447's bar on appeals).
35. Lundeen I, 447 F.3d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ.
v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988) (stating federal courts should consider whether
improper forum shopping is afoot when motions to amend and remand are
presented).
36. Docket, Lundeen 1, 447 F.3d 606 (No. 05-1918) (see Judge's Order, dated
Feb. 13, 2006).
37. Lundeen , 447 F.3d at 612-13.
1440 [Vol. 36:4
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railroads, shippers, and manufacturers have fulfilled their
obligations with respect to, among other things, inspection,
§ 212.101 (b) (1); and railroads face civil penalties for viola-
tions, § 213 App. B. It is clear the FRA regulations are in-
tended to prevent negligent track inspection and there is no
indication the FRA meant to leave open a state law cause of
38action.
Critically, the appellate court confirmed the statute's "complete"
preemption of "covered" claims so as to give rise to federal jurisdic-
tion:
[W] here we find the Lundeens' negligent inspection claims
preempted ... and where it is both clear the regulations at
issue are intended to prevent negligent track inspection
nationally and contain no savings clause (so there is thus no
indication the FRA meant to leave open a state law cause of
action), absent en banc review we are bound by our decision
in Peters to find complete,jurisdictional, preemption."
Impliedly rejecting the earlier Allende rationale, the Eighth Cir-
cuit disclaimed an alternative federal remedy as the sine qua non of
"complete" preemption:
The issue of whether complete preemption exists is separate
from the issue of whether a private remedy is created under
a federal statute. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
391 n. 4, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Complete
preemption can sometimes lead to dismissal of all claims in
a case. Although courts may be reluctant to conclude that
Congress intended plaintiffs to be left without recourse, see
M. Nahas & Co., Inc. v. First National Bank of Hot Springs, 930
F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 1991), the intent of Congress is what
controls. Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45,
41
107 S. Ct. 1549, 95 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1987) (citations omitted).
Like Mehl, Lundeen rejected assertions that § 20106 did not ex-
tend to allegations that the railroad failed to comply with (1) the
federal standard of care established by a "covering" regulation or
order; (2) its own plan, rule, or standard created pursuant to a
"covering" regulation or order; or (3) a state law, regulation, or order
not incompatible with federal railroad policy.
4 '
38. Id. at 614.
39. Id. at 614-15.
40. Id. at 613 n.4 (quoting Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d
536, 547 (8th Cir. 1996)).
41. Lundeen 1, 447 F.3d at 611-15.
2010] 1441
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42 43
En banc and certiorari review were denied . Direct review was
thus exhausted and the jurisdictional decision was final. Or so it
seemed.
4. District Court Proceedings Post-Lundeen I
On remand to the district court, the Chief Judge for the District
of Minnesota joined his colleague to the north, and the court found
every Minot derailment cause of action to be preempted.44 The
Minnesota Court, in a decision written by then-Chief Judge James
Rosenbaum, concluded that the statute preempts all "covered"
claims -even those based upon accusations that the railroad failed to
comply with (1) the federal standard of care established by a "cover-
ing" regulation or order; (2) its own plan, rule, or standard created
pursuant to a "covering" regulation or order; or (3) a state law,
regulation, or order not incompatible with federal railroad policy.
4 5
The Lundeens appealed the dismissal order to the Eighth Cir-
cuit. The world of railroad law would be turned on its head between
the filing of the appeal and the appellate court's ultimate answer.
D. Congress Makes a Play
While the appeal of the Lundeen dismissal was pending, Congress
entered the litigation fray. Congress tucked a proposed FRSA
amendment into a bill implementing the recommendations of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.46
In substance, the 9/11 legislation added new paragraphs (b) and (c)
to 49 U.S.C. § 20106 to adopt the arguments made by Minot plaintiffs
that had been rejected by two district court judges in the Eighth
Circuit, then-Chief Judge Hovland and then-Chief Judge Rosen-
baum:
(b) Clarification regarding State law causes of action.
(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
preempt an action under State law seeking damages for
personal injury, death, or property damage alleging
42. Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., No. 05-1918, 2006 WL 4671149 (8th Cir.July
18, 2006).
43. Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 549 U.S. 1179 (2007) (mem).
44. Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Minn. 2007).
45. Id. at 1016-17.
46. See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
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that a party-
(A) has failed to comply with the Federal stan-
dard of care established by a regulation or order
issued by the Secretary of Transportation (with re-
spect to railroad safety matters), or the Secretary of
Homeland Security (with respect to railroad secu-
rity matters), covering the subject matter as pro-
vided in subsection (a) of this section;
(B) has failed to comply with its own plan, rule,
or standard that it created pursuant to a regulation
or order issued by either of the Secretaries; or
(C) has failed to comply with a State law, regula-
tion, or order that is not incompatible with subsec-
tion (a) (2).
(2) This subsection shall apply to all pend-
ing State law causes of action arising from
events or activities occurring on or afterJanu-
ary 18, 2002.
(c) Jurisdiction.-Nothing in this section creates a Federal
cause of action on behalf of an injured party or confers Fed-
eral question jurisdiction for such State law causes of ac-
tion.
The legislators decreed that the substantive effect of§ 20106 as it
existed when Mehland Lundeen !were decided had not been changed:
"Subpart (a) of the Conference ... contains the exact text of 49
U.S.C. § 20106 as it existed prior to enactment of this Act. It is
restructured for clarification purposes; however, the restructuring is
not intended to indicate any substantive change in the meaning of the• ,, 48
provision. The Chairman of the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee made no bones about the law's purpose:
The bill does not change any of the current law, but only
adds to it to clarify the meaning of what is already in public
law.
The situation that needs to be cured is not that the statute
preempts negligence claims requiring a change. The situa-
tion needing remedy is the misinterpretation of the statute
by some courts [e.g., the Eighth Circuit]. That is precisely
what this clarifying language is intended to accomplish.49
47. 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (b)-(c) (Supp. 2007).
48. 153 CONG. REC. H8589 (daily ed.July 25, 2007).
49. 153 CONG. REc. H3109-10 (Mar. 27, 2007) (comments of Rep. James
2010] 1443
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In other hearings, congressmen from North Dakota and Minne-
sota made clear that the new language was intended to reverse the
Minot derailment precedents:
Mr. Pomeroy: [W] ill you continue to work with us to take
the steps necessary to ensure that courts construe this
amendment only as a clarification of Congress' original in-
tent?
Mr. Oberstar: We will pursue this issue in future hearings of
the subcommittee of relevance.
Mr. Pomeroy: Is it also your understanding that the same
Federal court that dismissed those claims urged the Con-
gress to remedy this situation and the language in section 3
does precisely what the court said needed to be done?
Mr. Oberstar: The situation that needs to be cured is not
that the statute preempts negligence claims requires a
change. The situation needing remedy is the misinterpretation of
the statute by some courts. That is precisely what this clarifying
language is intended to accomplish.50
The Rubicon had been crossed: Congress was expressly trying to
reversejudicial pronouncements that had run the course of Article III
review.
E. The Eighth Circuit's Decision and Rationale
Even though the final jurisdictional ruling was not on appeal, a
split appellate panel construed Congress's clarification as requiring
the re-opening and vacatur of Lundeen l's final judgment.5 A
prospective application of the law would have avoided separations of
powers implications by leaving intact the final Lundeen Ijudgment.
Instead, the majority retroactively applied thejurisdictional edict even
though Congress excluded the jurisdictional language from the
previous subsection directing that the compliance "clarification" shall
apply as of the date of the Minot derailment. 2 The majority sent the
cases back to the district court for ajurisdictional disposition giving
effect to Congress's perceived intent.
In dissent,Judge C. Arlen Beam looked to settled Supreme Court
Oberstar, D-MN).
50. 153 CONG. REc. H3109-10 (comments of Rep. Earl Pomeroy, D-ND and
Rep.James Oberstar, Chair, D-MN) (emphasis added).
51. Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 532 F.3d 682, 688-92 (8th Cir. 2008)
[hereinafter Lundeen I].
52. Id; see 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (b)-(c) (Supp. 2007).
1444 [Vol. 36:4
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precedent and concluded that "[a]ny congressional attempt to
reverse Lundeen I... presents an insurmountable separation of
powers problem" because "thejurisdictional finding of Lundeen Iwas
a final judgment that cannot constitutionally be reopened or
reversed.5 ' The dissent invoked Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 54 to
explain that "once the time for appeal has expired, the word of the
last court in the hierarchy that ruled on the case is final, and not
pending."55 Judge Beam ultimately observed,
[T] his panel's unanimous judgment in Lundeen I based
upon a then-valid preemption mandate, that has not been
retroactively disturbed by statutory language and has been
fully vetted by the court en banc and the Supreme Court, is
not subject to congressional disposition. It is a final judg-
ment that may not be upset by an inapplicable portion of
subsequent legislation. The majority errs in its ruling to the
contrary.
Judge Beam noted that the separation of powers' entanglements
could have been avoided if the majority had recognized the jurisdic-
tional subsection to have prospective-only effect.57 Reading the
statutory "clarification" as written, the dissent observed that "Con-
gress addressed no issue of retroactivity except that found in subsec-
tion (b) (2), which by its language applies only to subsection (b)."58
Since subsection (c) -the jurisdiction provision-does not call for
retroactive application,Judge Beam acknowledged that "none of the
issues decided by. .. this panel in Lundeen I are reached by the
language of [the clarification] . 60
The Eighth Circuit denied CP's petition for rehearing. Judge
Beam again dissented, noting that the panel "sidestepp [ed] what has
actually happened in this litigation" because the exercise of federal
jurisdiction was no longer "on appeal. The dissent faulted the
majority for interpreting the clarification's language-which contains
"[n]o words of retroactivity"-to strip federal jurisdiction.62
53. Lundeen II, 532 F.3d at 701-02.
54. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
55. Lundeen II, 532 F.3d at 702.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 695-700.
58. Id. at 701.
59. Id.
60. Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 550 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 2008).
61. Id. at 751.
62. Id. at 752.
14452010]
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63The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari.
III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CONFLICT
Congress's conspicuous rebuke to the federal courts placed the
separation of powers front and center for the Lundeen panel.
Nonetheless, the majority looked the other way. Numerous compel-
ling precedents suggest that, in the process, Congress was allowed to
march past a fundamental judicial defense against overreaching by
the other branches.
A. Historical Underpinnings
The genesis of the separation of powers long pre-dates the debat-
ing and signing of the Constitution. The Framers lived among "the
ruins of a system of intermingled legislative and judicial powers.64
Legislatures would frequently set asidejudgments and order new trials
or appeals. 65 Lawmakers were all-too ready to "decide [] rights which
should have been left to judiciary controversy. "66 In the year proceed-
ing the Constitutional Convention, this "legislative interference in
judicial matters had intensified as never before in the eighteenth
century."
This ever-expanding pattern of legislative intrusion provided the
Framers ample incentive to institute appropriate safeguards.
68
"Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton each wrote of the factional
disorders and disarray that the system of legislative equity had
produced in the years before the framing; and each thought that the
separation of the legislative from the judicial power in the new
Constitution would cure them."
69
Madison observed that "the accumulation of all powers, legisla-
tive, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands... may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 70 This "Father of the
63. Lundeen v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 549 U.S. 1179 (2007) (No. 06-528).
64. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995).
65. See MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN
COLONIES 49-51 (1943) (discussed in Plaut).
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
67. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
454 (1969) (discussed in Plaut).
68. See Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the
Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST.
REV. 511, 514-17 (1925).
69. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 221.
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
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Constitution" summoned the renowned French political commenta-
tor Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brede et de Montesquieu:
"Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the
judge would then be the legislator.",
71
Jefferson was equally concerned about the potential for legislative
overreaching:
Nor should our assembly be deluded by the integrity of their
own purposes, and conclude that these unlimited powers
will never be abused, because themselves are not disposed to
abuse them.... The time to guard against corruption and
tyranny, is before they shall have gotten hold on us. It is
better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to draw-
ing his teeth and talons after he shall have entered.
72
The Framers therefore concluded that a judicial department
must be constitutionally independent of the legislative branch. These
fundamental aspirations of the Constitutional Convention manifested
themselves in Article III: "The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."73
As envisioned by the Framers, the legislature is empowered to
prescribe "the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are
to be regulated," but the prerogative of " [t] he interpretation of the
laws" is "the proper and peculiar province of the courts."74 This
separation of governmental power is fundamental to liberty and
justice because judicial independence is compromised whenever the
legislative or the executive interferes with the courts' "province and
duty ... to say what the law is."'5 Decisions immediately following the
Constitution's ratification confirm the Article III obligation to protect
76against Article I excesses.
The spirit and effect of the separation of powers were aptly
summed up by Thomas Cooley, whom the Supreme Court regards as
a "great constitutional scholar":
71. Id. (quotation omitted).
72. THOMASJEFFERSON, NoTEs ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 246 (Penguin Group
1999) (1748).
73. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Plaut, 514 U.S. at 221..
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
75. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
76. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798) ("The power [to
grant new trials] is judicial in its nature; and whenever it is exercised, as in the
present instance, it is an exercise ofjudicial, not of legislative, authority.").
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[T]he legislative action cannot be made to retroact upon
past controversies, and to reverse decisions which the courts,
in the exercise of their undoubted authority, have made; for
this would not only be the exercise ofjudicial power, but it
would be its exercise in the most objectionable and offensive
form, since the legislature would in effect sit as a court of
review to which the parties might appeal when dissatisfied
with the rulings of the courts.
As the legislature cannot set aside the construction of the
law already applied by the courts to actual cases, neither can
it compel the courts for the future to adopt a particular con-
struction of a law which the legislature permits to remain in
force. To declare what the law is, or has been is a judicial
power; to declare what the law shall be, is legislative. One of
the fundamental principles of all our governments is, that
the legislative power shall be separate from the judicial. If
the legislature would prescribe a different rule for the future
from that which the courts enforce, it must be done by sta-
tute, and cannot be done by a mandate to the courts, which
leaves the law unchanged, but seeks to compel the courts to
construe and apply it, not according to the judicial, but ac-
cording to the legislative judgment.
"After the States ratified the Constitution, it did not take long for
the fears of legislative encroachment on the judiciary's sphere of
action to be realized."7 8 Article III judges stood their ground,
remaining ever-vigilant against attempted legislative interference.
1. Hayburn's Case 9
In 1791, Congress enacted legislation permitting disabled Revolu-
tionary War veterans to apply for pensions.s° A claimant would
petition the federal circuit court, which would accept (or reject) the
applicant's eligibility and then award a pensionjudgment commensu-
rate with the veteran's disability.8 Congress, however, empowered the
secretary of war to deny the pension judgment when he suspected
77. THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrTATIONS 112-13 (6th ed. 1890); see
Plaut, 514 U.S. at 224-25 (relying upon Cooley's propositions as good authority).
78. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487, 1493 (6th Cir. 1993), affd 514
U.S. 211 (1995).
79. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
80. 13 CHARLESA. WRIGHTETAL., FEDERAL PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 3529.1 at
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"imposition or mistake." 2
In these early days of the republic, the Supreme Court justices
still "rode the circuit" and sat with the district court judges.3 Five
justices were confronted with the pension act while sitting with district
courtjudges on circuit court panels in New York, Pennsylvania, and
North Carolina.8 4  "Each panel independently and unanimously
declined to hear the veterans' petitions, reasoning that for the courts
to renderjudgments subject to review by the Congress was violative of
the separation of powers. ,
'5
The Pennsylvania panel concluded that a ruling on the applica-
tions could subject courtjudgments to being "revised and controlled
by the legislature, and by an officer in the executive department.
'' s
1
The potential for such interference was regarded as "radically
inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is
vested in the courts."
8 7
The North Carolina circuit summed up the problem as follows:
"[Nio decision of any court of the United States can, under any
circumstances, in our opinion, agreeable to the constitution, be liable
to a revision, or even suspension, by the legislature itself, in whom no
judicial power of any kind appears to be vested. ,
88
This first invalidation of congressional enactments confirmed the
constitutional wall erected to shield the judiciary against legislative
interference and to establish Article III courts as an independent and
co-equal branch of the government. The courts had no choice but to
repulse the attempted legislative attack upon judicial autonomy.
Unfortunately, this legislative incursion would not be the last;
stronger and higher walls needed to be built.
2. United States v. Klein"9
Klein arose when former citizens of the Confederacy attempted to
82. Id.
83. Plaut, 1 F.3d at 1492.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1493 (quoting Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 410). The quotation, as recited
in Plaut, varies slightly from the original as stated in Haybum's Case, although the
meaning remains the same. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 410.
87. Plaut, 1 F.3d at 1493 (quoting Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 410).
88. Id. (quoting Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 410). Again, this quotation differs
slightly from the original as stated in Haybur's Case, but the meaning remains the
same. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 410.
89. 80 U.S. (Wall.) 128 (1871).
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retrieve property the Union had confiscated. ° A statute forfeited all
property of persons engaged in or aiding the rebellion, as well as
appropriated all property abandoned or captured in the insurrection-
ist states. Former owners were, however, enabled to make claims on
lost property "on proof to the satisfaction of [the Court of Claims] ...
that he has never given any aid or comfort to present rebellion.""
One such property owner-V.F. Wilson-lost his cotton but was
subsequently pardoned.3 Wilson died before perfecting his claim; his
estate's administrator, Klein, continued the proceedings.94 The Court
of Claims ultimately awarded $125,300 in compensation. 9' The
government appealed to the Supreme Court.
96
Prior to hearing that appeal, the high court decided an identical
action involving a claimant named Padelford who had (1) partici-
pated in the rebellion, (2) abandoned his property, (3) obtained a
pardon, and (4) pursued a claim under the act. The Court of
Claims found the pardon to have "cured his participation in the
rebellion," entitling Padelford to compensation. The Supreme
Court agreed, concluding that for the purposes of this statute
Padelford had been exonerated. 99
Congress was not happy. Between the Padelford decision and the
Klein hearing, angry lawmakers attempted to reverse the judicial
application of the act by specifying that pardons would not be
admissible in forfeited property claims proceedings.' ° Congress
viewed such an interpretation to be "the true intent and meaning of"
the acts. T1 The Supreme Court was directed to decline jurisdiction
over any case in which a claimant had prevailed below by proving
loyalty with presidential pardon.0 2
When called upon to decide Klein's appeal, the Court acknowl-
edged general congressional power over appellate jurisdiction, but
held:
90. Id. at 136-41.
91. Id. at 130.
92. Id. at 131.
93. Id. at 131-37.
94. Id. at 132.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 132-33.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 133.
100. Id. at 133-34.
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[T] he language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not
intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means
to an end. Its great and controlling purpose is to deny to
pardons granted by the President the effect which this court
had adjudged them to have. The proviso declares that par-
dons shall not be considered by this court on appeal. We
had already decided [in the Padelford matter] that it was our
duty to consider them and give them effect in cases like the
present, as equivalent to proof of loyalty.O
The Supreme Court sized up the constitutional transgression as
follows: "What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause
in a particular way?" 104 If given effect the supposed clarification of
congressional intent would "allow[] that the legislature may prescribe
rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in
cases pending before it."'00 The Constitution was read to preclude
such legislative interloping.
The Court distinguished an earlier case -Pennsylvania v. Wheeling
Bridge Co. - which had condoned an effective reversal of precedent
by Congress. 0 6 The Wheeling court found a bridge to be a nuisance,
but a statute subsequently legalized the structure by designating the
river crossing as a post-road." 7 The Court distinguished the Klein
situation because, unlike the response to the Wheeling decision,
Congress did not enact new legislation; instead, Congress dictated
how the existing property reclamation act must be applied."' The
Constitution did not countenance such meddling because "the court
is forbidden to give the effect to evidence which, in its ownjudgment,
such evidence should have, and is directed to give it an effect precisely
contrary." '09 By so instructing the judiciary, "Congress has inadver-
tently passed the limit which separates the legislative from thejudicial
power." 1°
In sum, the Court held that Congress cannot "prescribe a rule for
[a] decision of a cause in a particular way" when "no new circums-
tances have been created by legislation."'' I Legislatively-imposed
"rules of decision" are thus unconstitutional because such enact-
103. Id. at 145.
104. Id. at 146.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 146-47 (citing 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429 (1855)).
107. Id. at 146.
108. Id. at 146-47.
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ments would empower Congress to usurp judicial prerogative by
interpreting, rather than passing, the laws. Since "[i]t is of vital
importance that these powers be kept distinct," statutes mandating
how existing law must be interpreted cannot pass constitutional
112muster.
3. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 13
Much more recently, the Court again affirmed the separation of
powers dichotomy that condemns congressional directives for the
application of pre-existing law but permits an enactment that actually• 114
amends the law. The constitutional determination thus turns upon
whether the law has, in fact, been changed.
Plaut arose out of the legislative response to a statute-of-115
limitations determination in a securities fraud case. As with the
supposed FRSA "clarification," Congress slid the attempt to reverse
jurisprudence into a completely unrelated bill. 116
For cases that had been pending, Congress directed that the ap-
plicable statute of limitations should be drawn from state law."' The
change was made retroactive to the day before the precedent it sought• 118
to attack, allowing for the revival of finaljudgments.
When the Supreme Court weighed in, Congress's incapacity to
"prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the
government in cases pending before it" was reaffirmed." 9 The
opinion surveyed the long history of judicial vigilance against
legislative encroachment, and noted that this country had been
founded upon the principle that "' [t] he interpretation of the laws"'
was "'the proper and peculiar province of the courts.' 120 The
maintenance of that separation depends upon "high walls and clear
distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be
judicially defensible in the heat of inter-branch conflict. 1 .' The
Court reminded, however, that the Klein prohibition against Congress
influencing the outcome of litigation "does not take hold when
112. Id.
113. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 214-15.
116. Id. at 214.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 214-15.
119. Id. at 218 (quoting United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871)).
120. Id. at 222 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
121. Id. at 239.
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Congress 'amend[s] applicable law." 12 Importantly, the statute of
limitations "fix" in Plaut did change applicable law.
Despite the change in law, the statute transgressed the separation
of powers by directing the judiciary to reopen final judgments.1
24
"When retroactive legislation requires its own application in a case
already finally adjudicated, it does no more and no less than 'reverse a
determination once made, in a particular case.'" 2 5 Thus, the statute
offended the Constitution by requiring the federal courts to act "in a
manner repugnant to the text, structure, and traditions of Article
I. 126
B. The Eighth Circuit Stands in Conflict of Supreme Court and Circuit
Precedent
1. Lundeen II Runs Afoul of Supreme Court "Final" Decision
Precedent
As seen from the preceding discussion, the essence of judicialS •. 127
power is the authority to render final decisions. Hence, the Plaut
court endorsed Alexander Hamilton's conclusion that the Constitu-
tion does not tolerate a legislative reversal of "'a determination once
made, in a particular case." ,1
28
For separation of powers purposes, "[f] inality of a legaljudgment
is determined by statute." 29 In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has
carefully distinguished constitutional and unconstitutional interven-
tions based upon whether the judicial determination to be altered is
"still on appeal" or instead deemed "final." 130
"Finality" should not be limited to decisions disposing of an en-
tire case. The circumstances in which Plaut arose strongly suggests
the precedent's applicability to final judgments on particular issues on
interlocutory appeal as long as core elements are satisfied. In Plaut,
the statute-of-limitations ruling in question was a final appealable
order under § 1291 and appellate review had run its course. These
122. Id. at 218 (quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audobon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 441
(1992)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 217-18.
125. Id. at 225 (quoting THE FEDERALISTNO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
126. Id. at 217-18.
127. See id. at 218-19.
128. Id. at 222 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
129. Id. at 227.
130. Id. at 226-27.
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circumstances precluded Congress from compelling reversal of a
"final" judicial determination by operation of a new law. Notably,
however, "final" did not mean "never again to be revisited." For
instance, the judiciary could have revisited the "final" limitations
ruling through collateral review.' 3' Based on Plaut, the factors
rendering a decision "final" are whether the judgment is final
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and direct judicial review has been132
exhausted; just because a court may later take a second look after
direct review does not make the decision any less "final. "1
33
In Lundeen II, Plaut's applicability should have been readily ap-
parent.' Lundeen !'s exercise of federal jurisdiction was "final"
pursuant to § 1291.35 The Supreme Court's rejection of a certiorari
review exhausted the statutory process for directjudicial review of the
remand.36  Moreover, the Lundeen plaintiffs did not appeal or
otherwise question federal jurisdiction when filing the notice of
appeal that produced Lundeen II; hence,jurisdiction was not even the
subject of appellate review when Congress intervened.
3
1
The fact that Lundeen Iwas ajurisdictional ruling is no excuse for
Lundeen II. Once decided, jurisdiction is just as "final" as any other
judicial determination. 3 1 Plaut safeguards Article III power against
131. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (permitting a court to relieve a party from a
final judgment or order under certain circumstances).
132. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226-27.
133. SeealsoTeague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-310 (1989) (determining that an
issue on collateral review is not subject to retroactive application of a new legal
standard); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376
(1940) (" [Judicial] determinations of [jurisdictional] questions, while open to direct
review, may not be assailed collaterally."); Hernandez-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 118
F.3d 1034, 1042 (5th Cir. 1997) ("When a case achieves finality under a statutory
scheme that precludes direct review by an Article III court, the judicial interest in
finality is also substantial.").
134. 532 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2008).
135. 447 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2006). SeeCunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S.
198, 202-04 (1999) (acknowledging that § 1291 can take hold of a single issue in a
case that "resolve [s] important questions separate from the merits" (quoting Swintv.
Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995))); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714-15 (1996) (stating that a remand order is "final" for purposes
of§ 1291).
136. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) (distinguishing
between "judgments from which all appeals have been forgone or completed, and
judgments that remain on appeal (or subject to being appealed)"); Ins. Corp. of Ir.,
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982) ("A party
that has had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matterjurisdiction may
not.., reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment.").
137. See Lundeen II, 532 F.3d at 695.
138. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 714-15 (stating that a remand order appealable
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Article I interference, and that power should have been no less
paramount over the single, final determination in Lundeen I than a
final determination over the entire case as in Plaut.
139
2. Lundeen II Conflicts With Circuit Authority
Prior to the Eighth Circuit's Lundeen II decision, several circuit
courts accepted and enforced the Supreme Court's directive that new
rules of law do not affect judicial determinations for which direct
review has been exhausted.' 4° With the Eighth Circuit's ruling, an act
of Congress will now have different effects for identical cases depend-
ing upon whether the litigants are lucky (or unlucky, as the case may
be) to be in a compliant circuit.
a. Circuit Courts Protecting Article III Prerogative
i. First Circuit
The First Circuit rejected Congress's efforts to change a final/. 141
ruling regarding statutory meaning while a case was still pending.
In a first appeal from a conviction for rape and carjacking, the First
Circuit concluded that the "serious bodily injury" prong of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 had not been satisfied to enhance the sentence by ten
additional years in prison. 14 The case was remanded for resentenc-
ing. 1
43
After remand, but before resentencing, "Congress's attention was
momentarily focused on [the First Circuit's] decision."'" Congress
passed the so-called Carjacking Correction Act of 1996 to rectify the
First Circuit's interpretation of the term "serious bodily injury" and to
clarify that the term should be interpreted to include "sexual
as "final" decision under § 1291); Ins. Corp. ofIr., 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.9 (noting that
ajurisdictional decision cannot be reopened once direct review exhausted).
139. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 408,410 n.* (1792) ("[N]o decision of any
court of the United States can, under any circumstances... be liable to a revision, or
even suspension, by the [l]egislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind
appears to be vested.").
140. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 217-19; see also Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S.
86, 97 (1993) (noting thatjudicial statutory interpretations are afforded retroactive
effect "in all cases still open on direct review").
141. United States v. Vasquez-Rivera, 135 F.3d 172, 177 (1st Cir. 1998).
142. Id. at 173-74 (discussing United States v. Vasquez-Rivera, 83 F.3d 542 (1st
Cir. 1996)).
143. Id. at 174-75.
144. Id. at 174.
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abuse. "145
In resentencing the defendant, the district court ruled that the
congressional amendment was a "'mere clarification' to the original
legislation, and thus was applicable to [the] remanded sentencing.'1 46
The district court again imposed an enhanced sentence. 41
On the second appeal, the First Circuit rejected the legislative
infringement on Plaut grounds because "post hoc statements
regarding the original legislative intent do not affect this court's
previous, and final, finding as to what that intent was." 148 Since the
First Circuit'sjudicial decision had achieved finality, Congress lacked
the power "'to declare by retroactive legislation that the law applica-
ble to that very case was something other than what the courts said it
was." ' 49 "Finality" for purposes of cutting off congressional action
attached even though the case was still pending and the judiciary
could have reversed itself on collateral review of the first decision.
ii. Fifth Circuit
The Hernandez-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell court was similarly con-
fronted with the issue of whether the rules could change after direct
review had been exhausted. 5 0 The Board of Immtgiration Appeals
had denied a motion to reopen a deportation order." As a result, the
order of exclusion became final. 52 The matter was appealed to the
Fifth Circuit in habeas proceedings.
153
As the appeal was pending, the attorney general amended the
rule under which the petitioner sought relief' 54 The petitioner
sought the benefit of the changed rule, but the appellate court
demurred on Plaut grounds because the order of exclusion had
become "final" upon exhaustion of direct review.155 Upon achieving
finality, the order could not be affected by a subsequent change in the
law.156 The court noted that when a judicial decision becomes final
145. Id. at 173-75.
146. Id. at 175.
147. Id. at 172.
148. Id. at 177 (discussing Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227).
149. Id. (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227).
150. 118 F.3d 1034 (5th Cir. 1997).
151. Id. at 1040.
152. Id. at 1036.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1042.
156. Id. ("When a case achieves finality under a statutory scheme that precludes
direct review by an Article III court, the judicial interest in finality is also substan-
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"'Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law
applicable to that very case was something other than what the courts
said it was.,157
iii. Seventh Circuit
In Lindh v. Murphy,158 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ana-
lyzed a petition for habeas corpus stemming from felony murder
convictions.,9 judge Easterbrook explained that Congress is prec-
luded from "limiting the interpretive power of the courts." 6 0 Thus,
lawmakers "cannot tell courts how to decide a particular
case ... Congress cannot say that a court must award Jones $35,000
for being run over by a postal truck... or provide that victims of torts
by federal employees cannot receive punitive damages., 161  The
Seventh Circuit concluded that "[o] nce the judicial power is brought
to bear by the presentation of ajusticiable case or controversy within a
statutory grant of jurisdiction, the federal courts' independent





The Ninth Circuit similarly refused to apply a new precedent to
an issue for which direct review had been exhausted. 163 In Alvarenga-
Villalobos v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit reviewed an appeal regarding
an alien who was deported for crimes "involving moral turpitude,"
reentered the United States illegally, and then filed a habeas petition
after his prior deportation order was reinstated. 164 The district court
denied the habeas petition, and the petitioner appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.' 65
The petitioner urged that a new interpretive rule "must be given
full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review." 16  The
petitioner's direct appeal rights, however, had already been ex-
tial.").
157. Id. (quoting Rivera v. I.N.S., 810 F.2d 540, 541-42 (5th Cir. 1987)).
158. 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
159. Id. at 872-75.
160. Id. at 872.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Alvarenga-Villalobos v. Ashcroft, 271 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001).
164. Id. at 1171.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1172 (citing Harperv. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86,97 (1993)).
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hausted. 16 In the appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the petitioner
sought "to apply to his prior order of deportation a new rule that did
not take effect until two-and-a-half years after he had been de-
ported." 168 Since direct review of that issue had been exhausted, the
"'general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review'
applied. Final civil judgments, such as the one the petitioner
sought relief from, "'may withstand subsequentjudicial change in that
rule."""
b. Lundeen II Stands in Conflict
By allowing a legislative clarification to supplant the finaljurisdic-
tional decision in Lundeen I, the Lundeen Ilmajority departed from the
other circuits that have refused to apply new rules to final decisions
for which direct review has been exhausted. This conflict threatens
the sound administration ofjustice because the various circuit courts
will afford dramatically different deference to congressional "clarifica-
tions": some courts like the First, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth circuits will
adhere to the majority rule and reject new rules of decisions intended
to change finally-decided issues. The Eighth Circuit, however, will
stand down to congressional revision. As a result, congressional
action that has one effect in one jurisdiction may have the opposite
effect in another.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The Eighth Circuit's ultimate decision in the Lundeen litigation
reaches far beyond the Minot derailment and the FRSA. In addition
to circuit conflicts and the erosion of separation of powers, the
Lundeen holding should be of concern to those arguing cases in
federal courts, particularly the Eighth Circuit.' Lundeen leaves all
decisions made on interlocutory appeals open for reinterpretation
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (plurality)).
170. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 308).
171. One commentator further suggests that Congressional action such as that
upheld in Lundeenviolates separation of powers principles becausejudicial decisions
may be classified as advisory opinions. "The important concern is that courts not be
required to render decisions that, without more, can be set aside in the discretionary
exercise of executive or legislative power .... A judicial declaration subject to
discretionary suspension by another branch of government may easily be characte-
rized as an advisory opinion." 13 CHARLES A.WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3529.1 (3d ed. 2008).
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until the time for appeal expires on the entire case. Practically
speaking, an interlocutory decision can be attacked by congressional
action at any stage in the proceeding even if the entire judiciary has
said its piece. This unsettling result from Lundeen should make
practitioners wary-the time, expense, frustration, and effect on
clients that would occur if Congress is emboldened to reopen
interlocutory judgments could be dramatic.
A. Lundeen, Plaut, and the Collateral Order Doctrine
The Lundeen majority held that applying the FRSA amendment to
the current litigation does not violate the U.S. Constitution because
"when the amendment became effective these cases were on appeal
and had not reached final judgments." 172 But, as also recognized by
the majority, the Lundeen case had gone through the entire appeal
process on the issue of jurisdiction, and the court had previously
decided that the Lundeens' cause of action was preempted. 17' The
issue ofjurisdiction had been appealed through the hierarchy of the
judiciary as a collateral order, and the time for appeal had passed
before the legislature enacted the statute at issue here.
174
It has long been held that 28 U.S.C. § 1291's "final decision"
standard permits appeals from certain interlocutory orders and
judgments before the conclusion of a proceeding. In Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the Supreme Court recognized that
there exists a "small class [of cases] which finally determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated." 175 In defining the cases that fit within this
class, the Court distinguished between those issues that would be
merged into the final judgment and appealable with the entire case,
and those issues that would lose their appealable nature when the176
case was finally decided. For the latter category, by the time of final
judgment the rights asserted would be lost,1 or the issue would be
172. Lundeen II, 532 F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2379
(2009) (mem.).
173. Id. at 687.
174. Id. at 702 (Beam,J. dissenting) ("Lundeen !s jurisdictional judgment has
been fully appealed, including a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, and any
appeal day has long since passed.").
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rendered moot. The implications of the Eighth Circuit's decision to
open this small class of issues to subsequent congressional review are
evident upon a brief summary of the collateral order doctrine.
To be appealable under the collateral order doctrine, a litigant
must demonstrate three criteria. First, the district court's decision on
the issue must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.' For example, in a case where a claim of absolute
immunity is denied, proceeding with the action without allowing an
immediate appeal would ignore the essence of absolute immunity-
the right not to answer for conduct in a court proceeding.'
79
Second, the interlocutory decision must "conclusively determine
the disputed question., 80 If there is the possibility that the district
court could change or alter its decision on the issue, it should not be
immediately appealed under this doctrine. As the Court stated in
Cohen, "[a] ppeal gives the upper court a power of review, not one of
intervention."'
8 '
And finally, the "question must involve a claim of right separable• . ,) 182 T -
from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action. In other
words, the decision cannot be a step toward the final judgment. It
must be wholly independent from the merits of the case. This
requirement helps protect the courts from engaging in multiple
reviews of the same issues.
8 3
Overall, the collateral order doctrine-both the requirements
and the justifications -are important to understanding the implica-
tions of Lundeen. The doctrine has been fashioned to give litigants
the opportunity to appeal immediately under § 1291, meaning that
the decisions on these issues are, and should be, considered "final
decisions" under that section. The requirements of the collateral
order doctrine make that clear. Appeal is only permitted from those
decisions that are separate from the merits, finally determined, that
would be lost after final judgment. Thus, collateral appeals may
properly be characterized as their own, separate cases embedded in a
larger case. The decision on appeal from these issues does not affect
the merits of the larger case, but it does impact the character of the
larger case. It would seem a fruitless endeavor to permit an appeal
178. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985).
179. Id. at 525 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)).
180. Id. at 527 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,468 (1978)).
181. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
182. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527 (quotation omitted).
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from these collateral orders under the justifications above, only to
allow the decisions to be reopened and subject to a different disposi-
tion later in the case. But this is what Lundeen accomplishes with its
holding.
B. Illustrations
The Eighth Circuit held that even those collateral orders that
achieve finality are still subject to retroactive review by Congress. 184 It
is not difficult to imagine another scenario like Lundeen in the context
of federal jurisdiction litigation. The following examples illustrate the
wide-ranging effect this decision could have on federal litigation.
1. Jurisdiction
Lundeen involved the assertion of federal jurisdiction. Because
the Eighth Circuit held that federal jurisdiction existed due to
preemption, the case went back to the district court for proceedings
consistent with that opinon -namely, dismissal. But federal
jurisdiction may exist on multiple grounds, each one subject to
interlocutory appeal under § 1291.186 Abstention is one such example.
Abstention exists in several varieties, but at its core the doctrine
enables a litigant to remove a case from federal court to state court.
87
The Supreme Court has held that remand orders based on abstention
principles are subject to immediate review under § 1291."' In
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Court recognized that an
abstention order surrenders federal jurisdiction of the lawsuit and
sends it to state court.189 If a litigant cannot appeal that order
immediately, the party loses the possible right to have a federal court
entertain the cause of action.
Under the Lundeen line of reasoning, abstention remains subject
to change until the entire case has reached final judgment. A party
unhappy with a federal district court's determination on abstention
184. See Lundeen II, 532 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2008).
185. Id. at 686.
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2008) ("The courts of appeals.., shall have jurisdic-
tion of appeals from all final decisions.. ").
187. See BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 9 (9th ed. 2009).
188. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712-15 (1996) (holding
that a remand order on "Burford abstention" grounds was immediately appealable);
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983) (holding that
a " Colorado River abstention" order was immediately appealable as a final decision).
189. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 714.
2010]
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could lobby Congress for a legislative reversal of that determination
that would apply even if the circuit court and the Supreme Court
affirmed the original district court's decision. For sake of illustration,
consider a case where the federal district court determines that
remand to state court is not appropriate on abstention grounds. The
circuit court and the Supreme Court agree. The case continues in
federal court and a proceeding on the merits begins.
Meanwhile, Congress passes a piece of legislation that essentially
reverses the district court's determination on abstention-the
legislation informs the court that, in fact, the elements of abstention
do exist in this case and it must be remanded to state court. The
previously-unhappy litigant now moves for remand. Despite the fact
that all of the courts in the Article III hierarchy have examined the
law and determined that abstention does not exist, and the fact that
the case has proceeded in federal court and, perhaps, has almost
reached a conclusion, the logic of Lundeen permits a legislative
reversal to affect this case. What was once certain is no longer. After
Lundeen, jurisdiction remains up for grabs.
2. Immunity
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court held that the president is entitled
to absolute "immunity from damages liability for acts within the.... ,,190
,outer perimeter' of his official responsibility. In this same case,
the Court held that an order denying a claim of absolute immunity is
immediately appealable under the logic of Cohen and § 1291.191
Because a claim of absolute immunity from civil suit raises a "serious
and unsettled question" of law, the Court recognized that an
immediate appeal from an order denying the president absolute
immunity is necessary.
192
The same logic follows when a litigant asserts the defense of qual-
ified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government agents from
civil liability for damages resulting from their conduct. 93 Like
absolute immunity, qualified immunity enables the government agent
to avoid standing trial for his or her actions. 94 Thus, an order
denying a claim of qualified immunity is also immediately appealable
190. 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982).
191. Id. at 742-43.
192. Id. at 742 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,547
(1949)).
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under Cohen for the same reasons as articulated in Nixon.'95 It would
be foolish to require the agent to proceed with the case only to
dismiss it after final judgment upon a finding of qualified immunity.J gm  g 197ty
Denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity is likewise imme-
diately appealable as a collateral order, 19 as is denying a claim of
foreign sovereign immunity.'9 The essence of all immunity is the
ability to avoid litigation, especially the demands of discovery. Under
the logic of Lundeen, a determination of immunity is still subject to
congressional review.
For illustrative purposes, consider the following hypothetical: a
group of plaintiffs files a lawsuit against a foreign nation for damages.
This nation attempts to dismiss the case under the theory of foreign
sovereign immunity, but the plaintiffs successfully argue to the district
court that the "terrorism exception" to foreign sovereign immunity
applies. The foreign nation appeals and the court of appeals reverses,
holding that the country does not fall under the exception and
foreign sovereign immunity applies to this country. The case is
remanded to the district court.
The district court, now sure that immunity applies, enters a dis-
missal order, which the plaintiffs appeal. Enter Congress. Congress
amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act °° to clarify the excep-
tion, bringing the nation back within the sphere of possible suit. The
case, again before the circuit court on appeal from the dismissal
order, looks at Lundeen, looks at the statute, and decides that it must
reopen the original ruling on immunity despite the fact that it had
been clearly determined that the nation should not be subject to a
lawsuit. The plaintiffs are now able to bring the claim.
This example reflects the character of the Lundeen decision. A
195. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,525-26 (1985).
196. Not to mention the difficulty in explaining to one's client why the damages
they won are actually not retrievable.
197. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state is immune from suit in federal
court brought by a citizen of another state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The doctrine of
sovereign immunity extends the state's immunity to suits by citizens of that state.
Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
198. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144-
45 (1993) (permitting the petitioner, who claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity
because it was an arm of the Puerto Rican government, to immediately appeal the
district court's denial of its immunity claim).
199. See Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (2009) (noting that Iraq
"invoked the collateral order doctrine" to appeal the district court's denial of Iraq's
motion to dismiss, which invoked foreign sovereign immunity).
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decision on immunity is no longer safe from the legislative acts of
Congress. If Congress does not agree with a court's decision on the
applicability of immunity, a simple amendment occurring after the
immunity determination is final can reopen and re-adjudicate the
order. While the plaintiffs who had an issue with the foreign nation
are happy, the principles of our Constitution are unsettled. Uncer-
tainty in federal litigation is the unfortunate consequence of Lundeen.
3. Other Examples
The collateral order doctrine, despite its "small class, 201 encom-
passes quite a few issues that may entice congressional review. Orders
allocating the expenses of identifying class members are immediately
202appealable. A district court's denial of a motion to modify a
protective order is immediately appealable.2 3 Pre-trial orders forcing
204
medication are also seemingly appealable under § 1291. The latter
example could present the most interesting results under the Lundeen
line of reasoning. An individual forced to be medicated pre-trial may
suddenly, in the midst of trial, be permitted to discontinue those
medications, resulting in undue mental or physical health ramifica-
tions. While these examples are by no means exhaustive, they present
a sampling of the types of "final decisions" that can still be reopened
and reversed by Congress.
C. Tipping the Balance-Congress and the Judiciary
Beyond the implications of Lundeen to the practicalities of litiga-
tion, a broader consequence of this decision involves the essence of
our constitutional dynamic. The powers between the branches of
205government may ebb and flow over time, but congressional
usurpation of the judiciary's primary function of decision making
could lead to incremental, yet drastic, shifts in power.
201. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 610-11 (2009) (citing
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
202. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.Janders, 437 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1978).
203. See Shigara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2005).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 950-51 (6th Cir. 1998).
205. The recent struggles between the branches of government following 9/11
and national security issues are one example of this ebb and flow. See, e.g., Johan
Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L &COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (2004) ("[I]t
is a recurring theme in history that in times of war, armed conflict, or perceived
national danger, even liberal democracies adopt measures infringing human rights in
ways that are wholly disproportionate to the crisis.").
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Lundeen II comes on the heels of Miller v. French, where the Su-
preme Court held that the legislature did not disrupt fundamental
separation of powers with a provision in the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA).20 The section at issue in Millerconcerned the "automat-
ic stay provision," which automatically stays a court's grant of
prospective relief for a period of time while a defendant's motion to
terminate the relief is pending. A group of prisoners challenged
this provision, arguing it violated separation of powers principles by
"legislatively suspending a final judgment of an Article III court in
violation of Plaut and Hayburn's Case."" 8 While the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the prisoners, holding that the statute operates as "a self-
executing legislative determination that a specific decree of a federal
court.., must be set aside at least for a period of time,, 20 9 the
Supreme Court disagreed. The high court held that the automatic
stay provision helps implement the new standards of law articulated by
Congress in the PLRA, and the prospective relief ordered by federal
courts in a consent decree is not a final order, as the decree remains
subject to continuing supervision by those courts. 2 ' ° Thus, the Court
permitted Congress to control consent decrees issued by federal
211
courts in prison litigation.
Commentators argue that Miller v. French represents a step toward
Congress having the power to legislatively dictate the outcome in
212
pending cases without amending the applicable law. Lundeen and
the failure of the Supreme Court to correct the Eighth Circuit's error
represent yet another step in that direction.
206. 530 U.S. 327, 348 (2000); see generally Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(e) (2) (2006) (enacting an "automatic stay" provision that would set aside a
federal court decision for a period of time).
207. § 3626(e)(2).
208. Miller, 530 U.S. at 342.
209. Id. at 335.
210. Id. at 347-48.
211. But see Taylor v. Ariz., 972 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (D. Ariz. 1997) (finding the
PLRA unconstitutional under separation of powers principles because "where
'Congress subjects the judgment to a reopening requirement which did not exist
when thejudgment was pronounced,' it violates the separation of powers." (quoting
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 234 (1995))).
212. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional Control Over the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts: A New Threat to James Madison's Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417,443-
44,446-47 (2000-2001); Gary Lawson, ControllingPrecedent: Congressional Regulation of
JudicialDecision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191,191 (2001) (describing the holding
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V. CONCLUSION
Allowing Congress to alter a final decision simply because other
parts of the case are pending is just one step away from Congress
acting as an adjudicator. But why do we care? The governmental
balance struck in the Constitution represents the Framer's fear of
legislative control over thejudiciary.21 And rightly so, considering the
fact that the legislature remains subject to the political will of the
people, whereas the judiciary is supposed to decide the law without
regard to momentary societal pressures. If these two branches
become more and more intertwined, and the courts continue to
permit congressional regulation of the core functions of thejudiciary,
Congress will be able to legislatively dictate the outcome in cases of
interest to constituents. As a result, the people may be more inclined
to use Congress, as opposed to the courts, to obtain a more desirable214
outcome in a given case. Not only does Lundeen represent the
challenges practitioners may face in federal court, the case also
represents the continued, and successful, attempts of Congress to
encroach on the powers of the judiciary.
213. Linda D.Jellum, "Which is to be Master," the Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837,859 (2009) (noting
that the Framer's feared the legislature because in the English system of government
the legislative and judicial functions had little separation).
214. SeeParamount Health Sys., Inc. v. Wright, 138 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1998).
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